Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection by Freedman, Lawrence R. & Prigoff, Michael L.
Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection
LAWRENCE R. FREEDMAN*
MICHAEL L. PRIGOFFS*
Since new paradigms are born from old ones, they ordinarily
incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual
and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously
employed. But they seldom employ these borrowed elements in
quite the traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms,
concepts and experiments fall into new relationships one with the
other. The inevitable result is what we must call, though the term
is not quite right, a misunderstanding between the two competing
schools. Thomas S. Kuhn'
Mediation and other alternative methods for dispute resolution have
made great progress in the past decade toward occupying a significant
role in relation to, and sometimes in lieu of, the traditional legal/judicial
system. One by-product of the emergence of these methods has been
the conflict between the new alternatives, the values they seek to promote,
and the interests protected by the traditional justice system. One of the
prime examples of this conflict is the desire for confidentiality in
mediation and the justice system's emphasis on consideration of all
available evidence.
It is incumbent upon those of us advocating the development of
alternatives to develop a clear and cogent policy which seeks to balance
and accommodate these competing interests, while ultimately allowing
salutary innovations, such as mediation, to flourish. The best way to
achieve this policy is through thoughtfully crafted legislation or court
rule.
This Note will seek to show why such a policy is necessary. It will
examine why confidentiality is so important to mediation and will then
demonstrate the need for a statute or rule to guarantee confidentiality.
For purposes of this short Note, the focus here will be on non-profit
community mediation.
CONFIDENTIALITY: A VITAL INGREDIENT2
Confidentiality is vital to mediation for a number of reasons:
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Effective mediation requires candor. A mediator, not having coercive
power, helps parties reach agreements by identifying issues, exploring
possible bases for agreement, encouraging parties to accomodate each
others' interests, and uncovering the underlying causes of conflict. Me-
diators must be able to draw out baseline positions and interests which
would be impossible if the parties were constantly looking over their
shoulders. Mediation often reveals deep-seated feelings on sensitive issues.
Compromise negotiations often require the admission of facts which
disputants would never otherwise concede. Confidentiality insures that
parties will voluntarily enter the process and further enables them to
participate effectively and successfully.
Fairness to the disputants requires confidentiality. The safeguards
present in legal proceedings, qualified counsel and specific rules of
evidence and procedure, for example, are absent in mediation. In me-
diation, unlike the traditional justice system, parties often make com-
munications without the expectation that they will later be bound by
them. Subsequent use of information generated at these proceedings
could therefore be unfairly prejudicial, particularly if one party is more
sophisticated than the other. Mediation thus could be used as a discovery
device against legally naive persons if the mediation communications
were not inadmissible in subsequent judicial actions. This is particularly
important where a mediation program is affiliated with an entity of the
legal system, such as a prosecutor's office.
The mediator must remain neutral in fact and in perception. The
potential of the mediator to be an adversary in a subsequent legal
proceeding would curtail the disputants' freedom to confide during the
mediation. Court testimony by a mediator, no matter how carefully
presented, will inevitably be characterized so as to favor one side or
the other. This would destroy a mediator's efficacy as an impartial
broker.
Privacy is an incentive for many to choose mediation. Whether it
be protection of trade secrets or simply a disinclination to "air one's
dirty laundry" in the neighborhood, the option presented by the mediator
to settle disputes quietly and informally is often a primary motivator
for parties choosing this process.
Mediators, and mediation programs, need protection against dis-
traction and harassment. Fledging community programs need all of
their limited resources for the "business at hand." Frequent subpoenas
can encumber staff time, and dissuade volunteers from participating as
mediators. Proper evaluation of programs requires adequate record keep-
ing. Many programs, uncertain as to whether records would be protected
absent statutory protection, routinely destroy them as a confidentiality
device.
Thus, a number of reasons exist which explain why confidentiality
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is so important to mediation. The Ethics Committee of the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution recognized this when they noted
that the "integrity of the dispute resolution process requires that the
neutral maintain confidentiality.
3
Preserving the confidentiality of mediation proceedings remains one
of the most compelling issues facing the field today. Yet, as paramount
as it may seem, this issue remains a vexing one.
Confidentiality in mediation is fundamentally at odds with a system
of law favoring consideration of all relevant evidence. A rule of privilege
such as that which we are discussing here shuts out probative evidence,
and thus obstructs the truth in order to protect some other interest or
policy. Courts are therefore very reluctant to find such privileges.
This tension between confidentiality in mediation and the search for
evidence in adjudication has given rise to a number of attempts to
pierce confidentiality. Courts have come down on different sides of the
issue for a variety of reasons," and as a result, the majority of com-
mentators have declared that the current grounds of protecting confi-
dentiality in mediation are uncertain.'
We favor a statutory provision or court rule guaranteeing the con-
fidentiality of mediation in appropriate circumstances. The fundamental
tension between mediation and adjudication, and the current uncertain
legal status of confidentiality, require the clear statement of law and
policy which is afforded by a statute or rule.
Provisions of this type have been enacted in a number of states
during the past six years.6 They typically insulate all written and oral
communications in a mediation proceeding from subsequent disclosure
in a legal proceeding, and often provide immunity from subpoena to
the mediator. Some statutes make exceptions to the general rule of
confidentiality, for example, bringing an action against a mediator.
Recently, some commentators, such as Professor Eric Green, have
questioned the wisdom of any legislation on confidentiality. Those who
argue against legislation on confidentiality maintain that blanket me-
diation privileges are unnecessary, unjustified, and counterproductive.
They assert that adequate protection may be found under current law
and no empirical data exists to support special protection. These com-
mentators also note the difficulty in formulating a blanket provision
3. Hay, Carnevale, & Sinicropi, Professionalization.: Selected Ethical Issues in Dispute
Resolution, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 228, 230 (1984). Courts and legislatures have long recognized
the need for protecting confidentiality in labor mediation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-100 (West 1972).
4. See N. ROGERS, supra note 2.
5. See N. ROGERS, supra note 2; Freedman, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(6) (Consol. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 12, §
1805 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1747 (West 1982).
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covering all forms of alternative dispute resolution in every subject area.
Perhaps most importantly, they argue that the rights of third parties
could be severely harmed unless a confidentiality privilege is carefully
construed and delimited. The following is a breakdown of these arguments
and an examination of each point seriatim.
THE NEED FOR EXPLICIT PRIVILEGE
Current law does not adequately protect confidentiality.7 Aside from
those jurisdictions where a specific privilege has been enacted, three
sources of law can aid in protecting confidentiality in mediation. They
are evidentiary exclusions, discovery limitations, and agreements of
confidentiality.
The general thrust of the common law and rules regarding compromise
and settlement would seem to protect mediation. However, the exceptions
are so numerous that they almost swallow the rule as applied to mediation.
Under common law, statements of fact made during compromise and
settlement negotiations are admissible into evidence in subsequent liti-
gation, unless carefully worded or framed Thus, the common law rule
provides little help to a freewheeling mediation session.
Many jurisidictions have adopted Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which strengthens the common law rule by barring evidence
of conduct or statements in compromise discussions. However, the pro-
tection afforded by Rule 408 is nevertheless severely limited. Rule 408
provides no protection when the validity or amount of a civil claim is
not in dispute. For a large number of mediations involving family,
neighborhood or minor criminal issues, Rule 408 would not apply.
Rule 408 affords no protection when the evidence from a mediation
proceeding is offered in subsequent litigation to prove or disprove
anything other than liability or validity of the claim or its amount. Bias,
negating undue delay, and obstruction are three exceptions explicitly
mentioned in the Rule - a variety of others have been recognized by
courts.9
Rule 408 is inapplicable in administrative or legislative hearings and
in jurisdictions where it has not been enacted. It provides no protection
against public disclosure of information revealed in mediation. Perhaps
most importantly, the Rule only affects parties to subsequent litigation:
mediation participants who are not parties to the litigation cannot raise
an objection to the introduction of otherwise confidential communications
7. See supra, note 2. See generally Restivo and Mangus, ADR: Confidential Problem-
Solving or Every Man's Evidence, in CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE, ABA Special Comm. on Dispute Resolution, 143, 146 (1985).
8. See Freedman, supra note 2, at 73; see also Sanderson v. Barkman, 272 Mich.
179, 261 N.W. 291 (1935).
9. See N. ROGERS. supra note 2.
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under the Rule. Thus, current law does not adequately prevent the
introduction of information from mediation proceedings into evidence
in subsequent litigation.
The law regarding discovery provides less certainty in assuring that
mediation proceedings will be kept out of attorneys' files in preparation
for subsequent litigation. Here, the general rule calls for disclosure, and
only under limited exceptions can the information be withheld. 0
Discovery may be allowed for a broader class of materials than would
be admissible in evidence." Any relevant information which may lead
to admissible evidence is discoverable. Courts have held that discovery
rules such as Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should
be construed broadly and liberally. 2 The court has inherent power to
quash a subpoena but a party seeking to do so has a particularly heavy
burden.'3 This latter decision involves a case by case balancing of the
discovering party's need for the information versus the harm caused by
disclosure.'4
In many situations, disputants agree at the outset of mediation that
nothing said will be subsequently disclosed. These agreements are per-
suasive as to the parties' intent. However, courts may not uniformly
uphold such agreements.
Agreements to suppress evidence are generally void as against public
policy. " Further, an agreement not to disclose does nothing to prevent
a non-party to the agreement from seeking or disclosing information. It
has been said that "no pledge of privacy ... can avail against demand
for the truth in a court of justice."' 6
The limited empirical data available suggests that a privilege is
needed. Those arguing against a confidentiality privilege claim that no
data is available supporting the necessity for a privilege.
Due to the nature of community mediation and the fact that it has
developed in a relatively brief time, there is not a great deal of reported
case law directly on point. 7 There are, however, a variety of reported
cases construing the applicable rules described above in settlement
discussions, activities which are arguably similar to mediation. No clear
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
12. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 9.
13. Broome v. Simon, 255 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. La. 1966); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 669 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1982).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 138 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. N.Y.
1956).
15. See N. ROGERS, supra note 2; Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note
2, at 451.
16. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286, at 528 (1964).
17. Community mediation often involves small disputes. If these cases go to courts,
the small amount often in controversy precludes the efficacy of appeal. Often, therefore,
court decisions on confidentiality are unreported lower court holdings.
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pattern of protection of confidentiality has emerged."8
For those few reported cases where the confidentiality of community
mediation has been challenged, confidentiality has primarily been up-
held.'9 However, these decisions have rested on a hodgepodge of different
legal underpinnings depending on the arguments made and the situation
presented. 0 Recent surveys of mediation program directors suggest-a
growing number of unreported cases where mediations have been
subpoenaed.
Fifty-two mediation programs recently responded to a legal issues
survey sent by the American Bar Association, Standing Committee on
Dispute Resolution in September, 1986. Nine programs reported that
an attempt had been made to seek the revelation in a court or other
proceeding of information discussed in a dispute resolution proceeding.
In seven instances, the information was not disclosed.
The argument is made that mediation is conducted everywhere without
a privilege and it has not really suffered. This argument is flawed by
the fact that most mediation is now done under the assumption that
communications are privileged under the law, even if they really are
not privileged.2
Thus, in many programs, the perception of a privilege is perpetuated,
even when not necessarily supported by law. This suggests that it is
difficult to compare jurisdictions where no legal privilege exists to those
where one does exist. A party to a mediation who believes the proceedings
are confidential is less likely to challenge its confidentiality than one
who does not share such a belief.
This widespread perception of protection underscores the need to
enact a privilege in order to match reality with belief. Otherwise, a
18. See N. ROGERS, supra note 2.
19. See ADR: Confidential Problem-Solving or Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7.
20. Id.
21. The following questions were included on a survey which was sent, with a cover
letter, to the 288 community mediation programs listed in DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM
DIRECTORY, 1986-87, ABA Special Comm. on Dispute Resolution (1986).
Are your dispute resolution proceedings confidential: If so, what procedures are
used to guarantee confidentiality? Do the parties and the mediator sign forms
agreeing to maintain confidentiality? Does legislation exist guaranteeing confidentiality?
Have any attempts been made to seek the revelation in a court or other proceeding
of information discussed in a dispute resolution proceeding? If so, what was the
outcome? If a judicial opinion regarding confidentiality of dispute resolution pro-
ceedings was rendered, please enclose a copy or indicate a citation for reference.
In your opinion, is legislation dealing with the legal issues discussed above necessary
and/or desirable? If it is, how should such legislation be structured?
A summary report and analysis of the survey is now in progress. It should be noted that




successful effort to disclose information considered confidential under-
mines not only the atmosphere of candor necessary to attract disputants
to the process, but also impairs the credibility of the program.
A confidentiality provision can be crafted with appropriate exceptions
and flexibility to mitigate the disutilities of a blanket privilege. Professor
Green, among others, says it is difficult to draft a statute. We agree.
However, this difficulty does not override the need for a privilege where
mediation is so vital to the effective functioning of our dispute settlement
system and confidentiality is so important to mediation. Some of the
potential problems of a mediation privilege include unfairness, an aura
of suspicion, concealment of criminal acts, and general harm to third
parties.
Of course, some of these disutilities are possible absent a specific
statutory privilege. In fact, a well-drafted statute may be able to prevent
or mitigate some harms which might otherwise occur without a statute.
A specific exception to a general confidentiality provision allowing
for evaluation of programs would help alleviate any aura of suspicion
about private mediation. Exceptions mandating use of confidential in-
formation in actions against the mediator would assure redress against
abuses of the process.
While excluding evidence from cases because of a mediation privilege
would undoubtedly cause some unfairness, it would be just as likely
that some unfairness would result in situations where confidential in-
formation is later used against an unwary participant in mediation. The
real question is whether, in the long term, the benefits of a privilege
outweigh the harm in individual cases.
Traditional privilege analysis sums up many of these issues into four
elements.' As applied to mediation, the traditional test is as follows:
1. Communications in mediation originate in a confidence that the
disputant believes will not be disclosed. The inherent nature of
compromise and settlement, along with the explicit assurances
uniformly provided by mediators and program directors, foster the
belief in the parties to that the proceedings are confidential.
2. Confidentiality in mediation is essential, as noted above, to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the
parties.
3. The community has clearly encouraged the practice of mediation.
Community groups, courts, bar associations, and others have been
active in the development of programs. The policy of law favoring
compromise and settlement of disputes which mediation advances
is clear.
4. The injury to mediation that would occur by the disclosure of
23. See J. WIGMORE. supra note 16, § 2285.
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communications is greater than the benefit gained by the correct
disposal of particular litigation. Without confidentiality, the me-
diation process becomes a house of cards subject to complete
disarray by a variety of potential disruptions. Thus, many prac-
titioners feel that one well-publicized case of disclosure could
deeply taint their efforts. Parties will be more reluctant to enter
a process where there is fear that it might be used against them
in subsequent legal action. Even if they do participate, the caution
in negotiating, which the threat of disclosure would require, would,
in many instances, render the process a pro forma nullity. A well-
publicized case of mediator testimony could forever damage the
mediator's reputation for neutrality and confidentiality.
Further, confidentiality of mediation is not necessarily a bar to correct
disposal of litigation. The information generated in a mediation pro-
ceeding is generated for the purpose of that proceeding, and would not
exist but for the settlement attempt. If the information is otherwise
discoverable, then it can be presented in subsequent litigation.24 Thus
mediation could not be used to shield otherwise relevant and admissible
evidence. In addition, if the mediation itself becomes the subject of
litigation, such as a suit against the mediator, then clearly this infor-
mation could be introduced into evidence. Both of the above circum-
stances could be handled through exceptions to a general privilege.
Other potential harms of a blanket mediation privilege exist which
should be addressed through appropriate exceptions. When child abuse,
or other illegal acts, are revealed in mediation, strict confidentiality
should not be enforced. A clear and well-developed statement of policy
through exceptions to a blanket privilege can address this issue as well
as other issues of heightened public concern. Currently, a variety of
approaches to this particular problem exist. Thus, many practitioners
involved are either confused or adopt narrow perspectives in this area.
Few mediation programs keep all information secret, regardless of
its nature. Some programs authorize reporting evidence of crime in
certain circmustances, others require reporting of such incidents in all
cases. Many of these decisions are made by program directors on an
ad hoc basis. A statutory exception to a confidentiality privilege could
be a vital aid in guiding mediators and courts and in delineating a
consistent policy based on thoughtful research and input of all relevant
individuals and groups.
Clearly, it would be hard to draft a statute with these exceptions
properly and carefully delineated. We particularly appreciate the problem
of the breadth of alternative dispute resolution and would recommend
24. This has been the approach taken where confidentiality has been provided by




tailoring protection to specific dispute resolution processes and subjects,
such as community mediation. Issues regarding the reporting of crimes
in an otherwise confidential relation have been vexing the legal profession
for the past few years. Nevertheless, the task is not impossible, and we
are impressed with the efforts of the Journal staff in drafting the models
proposed in this issue.
CONCLUSION
Where mediators seek agreements, judicial institutions seek verdicts.
A mediator's tool is revelation of real positions and interests. Courts
simply seek the facts. Mediation thrives on confidentiality, while ad-
judication requires public disclosure of all evidence.
While the growth of mediation in relation to formal justice has been
void of great controversy, the fundamental differences between the two
systems and the values they promote will impart a continuing tension
in their relationship. Confidentiality represents one of those points of
tension.
We believe that accommodating the balance between mediation's
need for confidentiality and the law's search for evidence is best ac-
complished through a statute or rule. Such a provision, through the
encouragement of a consistent and reasoned accommodation of the
interests of both systems, can lead to the best result in this ongoing
relationship-and a goal shared by both processes-harmony.
... Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see
different things when they look from the same point in the same
direction.... Both are looking at the world, and what they look
at has not changed. But in some areas they see different things,
and they see them in different relations one to the other. That is
why a law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of
scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to another....
Thomas S. Kuhn'
25. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 150-52 (1970).
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